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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Wilson with failure to register as a sex offender in one 
case and with two counts of lewd conduct with his daughter in another, and the 
two cases were consolidated for trial.  State v. Wilson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 581, Docket 39073, pp. 1-2 (Idaho App., July 12, 2013).  He was convicted 
by a jury on all three counts.  Id.  The Court of Appeals vacated his conviction for 
failure to register and affirmed his convictions for lewd conduct.  Id., at p. 9. 
 Wilson initiated the current case by petitioning for post-conviction relief.  
(R., pp. 4-71.)  Among other claims, he alleged several claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp. 6-38.)  The state moved to dismiss the petition, 
submitting relevant parts of the criminal case for consideration in relation to the 
motion.  (R., p.72-156.)  The state argued that medical, driving and employment 
records did not actually impeach the victim by showing that the defendant would 
not have been driving when she claimed, and therefore there was neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice from counsel’s decision to not admit those 
documents.  (R., pp. 82-83.)  The state argued generally that the proposed 
testimony of witnesses did not actually impeach the victim’s testimony, and 
therefore failing to pursue these potential witnesses also was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp. 83-86.)    
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The district court granted the state’s motion, generally for the reasons 
stated in the state’s brief.  (R., pp. 163-68; 3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L.1; p. 
11, L. 19 – p. 12, L. 12.)  The district court stated different reasons for dismissing 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to joinder, however, 
ultimately finding that conceding to joinder was a legitimate method for averting 
having the state bring a persistent violator enhancement.  (3/23/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 2 
– p. 11, L. 18.) 






 Wilson states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Wilson’s 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief? 
 
 (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Wilson failed to show that he established a prima facie claim that 
counsel’s agreement to join the cases and leave them joined for trial in order to 
avoid a charge of a persistent violator enhancement was ineffective assistance of 
counsel where counsel in fact avoided having the state charge the persistent 
violator enhancement? 
 
2. Has Wilson failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that 
trial counsel’s presentation of evidence was ineffective for failing to pursue 
evidence that his driver’s license was suspended and that he was medically 








Wilson Has Failed To Show That He Established A Prima Facie Claim That 
Counsel’s Agreement To Join The Cases And Leave Them Joined For Trial In 





 As part of his claim that counsel failed to provide a defense, Wilson 
alleged: 
Petitioner had repeatedly asked for separate trials; that he first face 
the Failure to Register allegations, and then, the Lewd Conduct 
Charges. Petitioner felt that if the charges were all combined and 
consolidated into one (1) case, then the prosecutor would be able 
to keep referencing his prior convictions, and keep using the Failure 
to Register allegations against him in order to negatively affect, 
sway and prejudice the jury against Petitioner, and this eventually 
affected the outcome of the verdict in the trial against Petitioner in 
this matter[.] 
 
(R., p. 36.)  Other than his verification of the petition, Wilson presented no 
additional evidence supporting this allegation. 
 The state, however, presented evidence of proceedings in the criminal 
case.  Among that evidence was a stipulation entered into by the parties in the 
criminal case to join the charges, filed on January 24, 2011.  (R., p. 120.)  The 
parties put on the record the basis for the stipulation, and Wilson personally 
agreed to the stipulation even after it was explained to him that evidence that 
was inadmissible as to one charge would be admitted at a joint trial.  (R., pp. 
148-49 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 9, L. 4 – p. 16, L. 9).)  One of the grounds specified by 
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defense counsel for stipulating was to avoid exposure to the habitual offender 
enhancement.  (R., p. 148 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 10, L. 11 – p. 11, L. 251).)   
 The issue of consolidation was again addressed on February 28, 2011, at 
a status hearing the day before the jury trial was to start.  (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 8 – 
p. 28, L. 9.)  Defense counsel represented that at the time of the initial stipulation 
to consolidate he had believed Wilson was not eligible for the enhancement on 
either case absent a conviction in one of them.  (Trial Tr., p. 25, Ls. 14-18.)  
Some time the prior week, however, the prosecution had done a background 
check and discovered Wilson had “four prior felony convictions.”  (Trial Tr., p. 25, 
Ls. 19-25.)  Defense counsel represented that “if we had known that, we may 
have come up with a different position on whether or not to consolidate these 
matters,” because the stipulation ultimately did not accomplish the goal of making 
Wilson ineligible for the enhancement.   (Trial Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-23.2)  The parties 
then put on the record that they had stipulated that “[i]f these cases are tried 
together and go forward to trial tomorrow, [the state was] not moving to add the 
habitual.”  (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 24 – p. 27, L. 15.) 
 In post-conviction the district court determined that the initial stipulation 
“was a strategy based on ignorance, because in fact, Mr. Wilson already had 
sufficient felonies that [the state] could have filed a persistent violator 
                                            
1 Trial counsel recognized that the enhancement only mattered in the failure to 
register case, because that crime, unlike lewd conduct, did not already carry a 
sentence of up to life.  (R., p. 148 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 23-25).) 
 
2 Counsel’s use of the word “we” is interesting here because it is highly 
implausible that Wilson was ignorant of the fact he had been convicted of more 
than one felony. 
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enhancement.”  (3/23/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 24 – p. 11, L. 7.)  There was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel, however, because the parties reached the same deal 
once the accurate facts became known.  (3/23/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 8-18.) 
 On appeal Wilson argues that the district court erred because “[b]y the 
time defense counsel realized his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to 
move to sever the two unrelated cases,” and claims trial counsel’s agreement to 
keep the cases joined was based on “last minute attempts to rationalize the 
decision.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  Wilson’s claims of error fail, because they 
are not based on the law or the facts. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
 
C. The Record And The Law Support The District Court’s Summary 
Dismissal 
 
To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present 
admissible evidence making out a prima facie case as to each essential element 
of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof.  Adams v. 
State, 158 Idaho 530, 537, 348 P.3d 145, 152 (2015); DeRushé v. State, 146 
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 
710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 2015); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 
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873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).  “Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the 
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”  
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
The elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984).  To establish deficient performance, the petitioner “must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. 
at 688.  To establish prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”  Id. at 694.  With respect to the prejudice prong, the United 
States Supreme Court has articulated the petitioner’s burden under Strickland as 
follows: 
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052.  It is not enough “to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”  Id., at 693, 
104 S.Ct. 2052.  Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Id., at 
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). “When evaluating an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic and 
tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.”  
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State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). 
 The record in this case shows that the defense twice stipulated to joinder 
of the cases in exchange for the prosecution’s waiver of the right to file a 
persistent violator enhancement on the failure to register case.  The first time, the 
record shows, the stipulation was based on a factually erroneous belief that 
Wilson had been convicted of only one prior felony.  The second, however, was 
based on a proper understanding of the facts.  The district court properly 
concluded, therefore, that there was no evidence that the strategic decision to 
stipulate to joinder in exchange for the state not filing a persistent violator 
enhancement was the result of deficient performance nor that there was any 
prejudice from the initial factual misunderstanding. 
 Wilson makes the general claim that the district court erred.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 15-20.)  Specifically, he argues: “By the time defense counsel realized 
his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to move to sever the two 
unrelated cases.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  He also states that joinder “would 
only harm” him and that the second stipulation was the result of “last minute 
attempts to rationalize the decision” to initially agree to joinder.  (Id.)  Because 
Wilson cites neither the record nor any law for these assertions, he has failed to 
show error.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009) 
(“This Court will not presume error on appeal, and an appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating error through the record.”). 
More than a complete lack of support, the record actually refutes Wilson’s 
argument.  At the time of the second stipulation to keep the cases joined and not 
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add the persistent violator enhancement the prosecutor put on the record how 
the state intended to proceed if there had been no stipulation to join:  “If we took 
that route [lack of a stipulation], what we would do would be to is [sic] dismiss 
and refile to separate the cases and go forward that way.  So it’s not an issue for 
trial tomorrow.”  (Trial Tr., p. 27, Ls. 12-15.)  The trial court agreed that the state 
would otherwise have “the option of dismissing these and refiling, but that isn’t 
anything in terms of adding [the enhancement] in for tomorrow.”  (Trial Tr., p. 27, 
Ls. 22-25.)  Wilson’s appellate claim that it was too late to sever is simply wrong.  
Moreover, in relation to the first stipulation the district court engaged in a colloquy 
with Wilson, during which the court made sure Wilson understood that evidence 
irrelevant to one charge would come in to trial to support the other charge, and 
that Wilson agreed with the tactical decision to join the cases.  (R., p. 149 
(1/24/11 Tr., p. 14, L. 4 – p. 16, L. 9).)  Wilson’s appellate claim that there was no 
tactical advantage to be had by joinder and that counsel was merely rationalizing 
a wrong decision previously made is a complete fabrication contrary to the 
record. 
Wilson alleged that his trial counsel stipulated to joinder of the cases over 
his objection and for no reason.  The record of the underlying criminal case 
shows that counsel, with Wilson’s full endorsement, stipulated to joinder in 
exchange for the state not adding a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  
That counsel initially understood that Wilson was not immediately eligible for the 
enhancement (a fact he could not have gotten wrong absent Wilson misleading 
him or withholding information) ultimately played no role in the stipulation finally 
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entered.  Counsel secured for Wilson freedom from being charged as a 
persistent violator in exchange for stipulating to joinder, a tactical decision Wilson 
supported at the time.  The district court correctly concluded that Wilson’s 
allegations did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel after considering the underlying record. 
 
II. 
Wilson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claims That 




 Wilson made various claims that counsel failed to present favorable 
evidence at trial.  Specifically, he claimed counsel should have presented 
employment, medical and driving records to rebut the victim’s testimony that he 
molested her when driving between Twin Falls and Emmett (R., pp. 6, 12-14) and 
that he failed to call several of Wilson’s family members to testify about his 
access to the victim (R., pp. 6, 15-18).  In support of these allegations Wilson 
presented the following evidence3:  An affidavit from Jered L. Wilson (Wilson’s 
father) that he would have rebutted testimony offered at the preliminary hearing 
that Wilson sexually abused the victim “every time” he drove her between Twin 
Falls and Emmett by testifying that he was in the car on at least one of those trips 
and knew no abuse had taken place (R., pp. 55-57);  an affidavit from Barbara 
Wilson (Wilson’s mother) stating that the sexual abuse could not have happened 
                                            
3 Much of the affidavits is based on hearsay and is thus not admissible evidence.  
The state here addresses only the relevant, admissible evidence provided in the 
affidavits.  Wilson relies extensively on portions of the affidavits that are not 
admissible evidence.  Ultimately, admissibility of the evidence does not change 
the outcome of the analysis. 
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at a house Wilson was renting to his sister and she never witnessed any signs of 
inappropriate behavior between Wilson and the victim (R., pp. 58-60); an affidavit 
from Jesse Wilson stating he never witnessed any signs of inappropriate 
behavior (R., pp. 61-62); letters notifying Wilson his driver’s license was 
suspended for 180 days beginning on March 20, 2006, and his commercial 
driving privileges were suspended until March 20, 2007, because of a DUI 
conviction (R., pp. 65-68); and medical records showing he had gone to the 
emergency room on April 16, 2006, and January 22, 2007, complaining of ankle 
pain (R., pp. 69-71). 
 In requesting summary dismissal the state pointed out that trial counsel 
had explored the issues of Wilson’s ankle injury, presence of others in the car, 
and access to the victim through cross-examination of state’s witnesses; that the 
evidence offered by Wilson in the post-conviction did little, if anything, to rebut 
the state’s evidence; and ultimately the evidence did not show deficient 
performance on the tactical decision of what evidence to present or prejudice.  
(R., pp. 82-83.)  The district court dismissed based on the reasons articulated in 
the state’s motion.  (3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 1; p. 11, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 
21.)   
 On appeal Wilson argues the district court erred because he presented a 
prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.  20-






B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed The Claim That Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Not Presenting Certain Evidence Because That Decision 
Was Tactical And There Was No Evidence Of Prejudice 
 
“A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong 
presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 
(2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).  It is also 
well established that “‘decision to impeach a witness is a tactical decision” and 
“the decision of what evidence should be introduced at trial is also tactical.”  
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 447, 180 P.3d 476, 486 (2008) (citing Bagshaw 
v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005)).  “When 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-
guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a 
basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 
136 (2008).  Wilson presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming by 
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counsel and therefore did not in any way rebut the presumption of effective 
assistance of counsel. 
The district court dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
because the record showed that trial counsel had addressed the issues related to 
whether Wilson drove the victim alone and whether he had access to the victim 
through cross-examination and the evidence provided by Wilson was of marginal 
value.  (3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 1; p. 11, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 21; see also 
R., pp. 82-83 (state’s argument adopted by district court).)  Because the decision 
of what evidence to present is tactical, the evidence was of marginal utility to the 
defense, and there is no evidence that trial counsel’s decision to not present the 
proffered evidence was the basis of some objective shortcoming, the district 
court properly concluded that there was no prima facie showing of deficient 
performance or prejudice.   
On appeal Wilson argues the district court erred because “the affidavits 
called into question the veracity of the testimony presented at trial.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 23.)  “The district court should have thus held an evidentiary hearing 
where the potential defense witnesses’ had knowledge that undercut the State’s 
witnesses’ testimony.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 24 (grammar original).)  As to the 
driving and medical records, Wilson argues he “did not have to establish that he 
was physically unable to drive for the entire two-year time period, it would have 
been sufficient for his counsel to impeach the witnesses using such information, 
in order to place further [sic] doubt in the jurors’ minds.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)  
This argument misapprehends the applicable law, however.  It is not enough to 
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show that the evidence was relevant, or even that some other attorney would 
have chosen to present it at trial.  Rather, Wilson must show that the decision to 
not present the evidence was based on an objective shortcoming.  Having failed 
to present any objective shortcoming, Wilson failed to rebut the presumption that 
counsel’s choices were not in violation of his constitutional duty.  Having failed to 
present any evidence rebutting the presumption of effective assistance, there 
was no material issue of fact to decide. 
The district court summarily dismissed Wilson’s claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for choosing not to present testimony and documents that indicated 
Wilson did not always pick up the victim alone for part of the period where the 
sexual abuse was occurring because the evidence in question was of marginal 
significance and counsel’s decision was tactical.  Wilson has failed to show error 
because there is nothing to rebut the presumption that counsel’s tactical decision 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Wilson’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 21st day of June, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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